Strategic Communication for Crisis Management Operations of International Organisations: ISAF Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2010, January 2010 by Peters, Severin
www.coleurope.eu
Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies
EU Diplomacy  
Papers
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 / 2009
Strategic Communication for Crisis Management 
Operations of International Organisations: 
ISAF Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo
Severin Peters 
 
Department of EU International Relations 
and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
E EU U   D Di ip pl lo om ma ac cy y   P Pa ap pe er rs s   
1 1/ /2 20 01 10 0 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Communication for Crisis Management 
Operations of International Organisations:  
ISAF Afghanistan and EULEX Kosovo 
 
Severin Peters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Severin Peters 2010 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2010 
About the Author 
 
Severin Peters works as a communication consultant for GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Technische Zusammenarbeit) in Germany. He holds an MA in EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies from the College of Europe in Bruges, Belgium, and 
studied Social and Economic Communication and Political Science in Berlin, 
Germany, and Nairobi, Kenya. This paper is based on his Master’s thesis presented at 
the College of Europe (2009, Marcus Aurelius Promotion).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Benjamin Barton, André Ghione, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Dieter Mahncke, Jing Men, Anne-
Claire Marangoni, Hugo Palma, Shannon Petry  
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do 
not necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe.  
  2 Severin Peters 
Abstract 
 
Strategic communication is crucial for the success of civilian and military crisis 
management operations. Domestic publics have to be convinced that the 
operations are worth pursuing, and the publics in the countries where the operations 
take place have to be persuaded to support the missions’ objectives. Two major 
security actors have recently increased their strategic communication efforts: the EU, 
with EULEX Kosovo, and NATO, with the ISAF mission. Through a comparative study of 
these two cases, this paper addresses the question how and why strategic 
communication of the EU and NATO in crisis management operations varies and 
what general principles of strategic communication of international organisations 
can be deduced. NATO has recently stepped up its communication activities due to 
domestic pressure, while communication for EULEX remains technical and 
information-oriented because of the political disagreements among EU member 
states regarding Kosovo. I argue that five factors determine the communicative roles 
of international organisations: the role of the member states, the need for domestic 
ratification, the possibility of promoting the international organisation through the 
operation, the international organisation’s communicative capabilities and the 
importance of the foreign public to the success of the operation. The member states’ 
communicative activity largely determines the communicative tasks of international 
organisations. If member states require domestic ratification, they are likely to boost 
their domestic communication efforts, which makes a ‘unity of message’ difficult for 
international organisations that then have to focus primarily on coordinating 
member states’ domestic communication efforts. Additionally, member states are 
generally more reluctant to communicate to foreign publics, forcing international 
organisations to assume communicative leadership. 
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"You can’t take the media side less seriously than  
you actually take the military operation itself." 
Jamie Shea, former NATO spokesperson1 
 
"Communication is politics, and politics is communication." 
EU official2 
 
1. Introduction: The Importance of Communication for Crisis Management 
 
It was a telling, embarrassing moment. At a press conference in Afghanistan in 
September 2008, a journalist asked the German Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung: 
"Are we at war here?" Jung answered emphatically: "We are not at war!" Next to him 
stood the commander of NATO’s operation in Afghanistan, the American four-star 
general David McKiernan, gazing at the questioner. Tersely, he formulated his 
contrary opinion: "Of course, we are at war."3 
 
It does not happen very often that one can observe the failure of a communication 
strategy as closely as in this case. Two central players of the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), the crisis management operation in Afghanistan led by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), contradicted each other over a central 
question of the mission in front of a dozen cameras. Even the least informed observer 
realised immediately that this was more than just a difference of opinion: it was a 
strategic rift.  
 
Such problems are hardly conceivable for the European Union Rule of Law Mission in 
K o s o v o  ( E U L E X ) .  W h e n  t h e  c i v i l i a n  c r i s i s  m a n a g e m e n t  o p e r a t i o n  l a u n c h e d  b y  t h e  
European Union (EU) reached full operational capacity in April 2009, it went largely 
unnoticed by publics in the EU even though the deployment had been a 
controversial issue in international relations for about two years. Yet EULEX – the 
biggest civilian mission ever deployed by the Union – is also closely linked to public 
opinion, as a failure in Kosovo would mean a harsh setback for the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP).  
 
The issue of strategic communication for crisis management operations has not been 
w i d e l y  s t u d i e d  –  e v e n  t h o u g h  i t  i s  o f  crucial importance to the success of these 
missions. First of all, domestic publics have to be in favour of crisis management 
operations, as a lack of domestic public support may limit the strategic alternatives 
of decision makers to a point where withdrawal is the only viable option. Second, 
                                                 
1 J. Shea, "Kosovo – Then and Now", NATO Review, retrieved on 30 April 2009, www.nato.int/ 
docu/review/2008/07/VID_JAMIE_SHEA/EN/index.htm. 
2 Interview with EU official C, Brussels, 17 March 2009. 
3 T. Sommer, "Pflicht, Mut und sehr viel Frust", Zeit Online, 16 October 2008. 
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foreign publics – the publics in the countries where the operations take place – are 
often crucial to the the missions’ success. If the local population is against the 
presence of foreign actors, structural long-term changes in the country, which are 
often the objective of crisis management operations, cannot be realised.  
 
This paper analyses strategic communication for crisis management operations of 
international organisations by examining two recent cases, namely ISAF and EULEX 
Kosovo. Both missions are of crucial importance to the respective international 
organisation because their success or failure will help decide the future of the crisis 
management activities of the EU and NATO. Both are large, long-term missions with 
far-reaching implications for domestic and foreign publics. Both are ongoing and 
represent the state-of-the-art in EU and NATO strategic communication. Furthermore, 
both missions represent the core activity of the respective international organisation: 
EULEX is a civilian rule of law mission which corresponds to the idea of the EU as a 
civilian power, while ISAF is a military operation conducted by the most powerful 
security alliance in the world. This difference allows a comparison of communications 
regarding civilian and military operations.4 
 
The study addresses the following questions: How do the EU and NATO conduct 
strategic communication for EULEX and ISAF and which factors explain the similarities 
and differences of the two campaigns? What general principles for strategic 
communication for crisis management operations of international organisations can 
be deduced? 
 
NATO has recently stepped up its communication efforts in order to meet rising 
public pressure both domestically and in Afghanistan, while EULEX’s communication 
remains rather reactive and technical. I argue that this can be explained by the 
general principles of strategic communication for crisis management operations of 
international organisations: if an operation requires domestic ratification, member 
states become active and must be coordinated by the international organisation in 
order to achieve a ‘unity of message’. In the absence of domestic pressure, the 
international organisation has the option of promoting the operation itself in order to 
enhance its reputation as a security player. As member states are mostly reluctant to 
address a foreign public, international organisations must assume communicative 
leadership in this regard. 
 
The term strategic communication – and not one of the many other names for 
communication in the arena of foreign policy – has been chosen for this paper 
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4 Interview with EU Official A, Bruges, 16 January 2009; interview with NATO official A, Brussels, 
6 November 2008. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2010 
because it seems to be the most comprehensive expression. For instance, within 
NATO the term public diplomacy is limited to political communication, while military 
communication is left out. The term media relations ignores more direct forms of 
communication such as personal contact or the internet, while strategic influence 
has a connotation of twisted truth, if not propaganda. 
 
Communication is defined, based on Bruhn, as the transmission of information and 
meaning in order to direct the attention, knowledge, attitude and behaviour of 
certain addressees.5 This definition encompasses diverse forms of communication 
from media relations to contacts with the civil society and roadshows. The term 
strategic communication refers to the systematic planning of communication 
activities and underlines that communication as understood here is not a random 
act, but one that follows specific objectives. 
 
So how do NATO and the EU conduct strategic communication for ISAF and EULEX? 
 
2. ISAF 
 
2.1. Background 
 
In response to the attacks of 11 September 2001, the United States of America (USA) 
led a coalition of states into Afghanistan in order to oust the Taliban from power. 
After installing a new Afghan government, the international military presence in 
Afghanistan was split up: while the American operation Enduring Freedom was 
active country-wide hunting terrorists, ISAF protected the capital Kabul to create a 
safe space for the Afghan government and international actors to operate. ISAF was 
a coalition of the willing led by Britain and operated under a mandate from the UN 
Security Council.6 Only on 11 August 2003 did NATO come into play, assuming 
leadership of the ISAF operation; it expanded its presence to the entire country by 
2006. 
 
It was only then – three years after taking over ISAF – that NATO realised that it had to 
increase its communication efforts. Public attention began shifting from Iraq to 
Afghanistan where NATO was increasingly involved in heavy fighting with the Taliban 
in the south and the east of the country. Suddenly, governments were announcing a 
growing number of casualties, and parts of the public began wondering whether 
NATO would be able to succeed in Afghanistan. This "made governments realise that 
                                                 
5 M. Bruhn, Unternehmens- und Marketingkommunikation: Handbuch für ein integriertes 
Kommunikationsmanagement, Munich, Vahlen, 2005, p. 3. 
6 "NATO's Role in Afghanistan", NATO website. 
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public diplomacy is a critical instrument to sustain public and parliamentary support 
for operations there".7 
 
The communication deficit was reinforced by the fact that many governments – 
most notably Germany, Great Britain and Canada – had argued vis-à-vis their home 
constituencies in 2003 that the ISAF campaign would mostly be a reconstruction and 
democracy-building effort. As the number of civilian and military casualties began to 
rise, it was increasingly difficult to maintain this defensive line of argument, not least 
because other members of the alliance wanted to communicate the combat 
nature of the campaign more openly.8 
 
Thus, two problems had to be addressed by the new approach towards 
communication that NATO adopted from 2006 onwards. First, more time, energy and 
resources had to be devoted to communication efforts. Second, the enormous 
coordination challenges between the different actors had to be tackled in order to 
achieve the degree of ‘unity of message’ deemed necessary for a persuasive 
campaign in NATO countries and in Afghanistan. 
 
2.2. Actors 
 
Member state governments play the most important role in explaining and justifying 
the ISAF operation to their publics as they not only have the most direct access to 
national media, but also the highest democratic legitimacy and responsibility to 
decide on questions of war and combat. Although they are part of NATO, the 
member states remain sovereign with regard to political as well as communicative 
decisions. Member state governments, not NATO itself, bear the main responsibility 
for convincing their publics of the necessity of military operations, and they use the 
whole range of communication tools to do so. NATO member states have different 
political cultures, different historical backgrounds and different roles within the NATO 
operations. National caveats – the extent to which individual nations define their role 
within ISAF, especially regarding tasks or decisions they are not ready to assume – are 
of crucial importance for understanding NATO communication.9 
 
Germany is the perfect example of a country which chooses its own path within the 
ISAF operation in terms of politics, military and communication. Traditionally, the 
political culture and public opinion of post-World War II Germany are very wary of 
out-of-territory military operations, and each deployment of the German army 
requires a mandate from the German parliament. This sets considerable limits on the 
                                                 
7 S. Babst, "Reinventing NATO’s Public Diplomacy", Rome, NATO Defence College, 2008, p. 4. 
8 Interview with NATO official B, Brussels, 13 February 2009. 
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autonomy of decision by the German government, which stated from the outset that 
the German military would only be deployed in the comparatively calm northern 
part of Afghanistan where the Taliban receive little support from the population. 
 
This exceptional political and military position of Germany has been reflected by a 
communication strategy which has been described as "timid".10 German officials 
have portrayed the operation as a largely peaceful, development-oriented 
endeavour and have for the most part remained silent about its dangers. The 
German communication approach avoids the more offensive tone of many of its 
allies, most notably the United States. From the beginning, Washington has framed 
the Afghanistan operations as a direct response to the 11 September 2001 attacks. 
The US engagement in Afghanistan is portrayed as a war in order to defeat terrorists 
with force, and even Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Barack Obama has not altered this 
line of argument.11 
 
These diverging justifications of ISAF are not leading towards a ‘unity of message’ 
required for a successful communication strategy. This is why in July 2006 NATO 
created a Media Operations Centre within its Public Diplomacy Division, intended to 
streamline messages relating to ISAF. It oversees both NATO and member state 
communication. In the Media Operations Centre, all NATO media communication is 
planned, including the coordination of the different actors. The Media Operations 
Centre works closely with the office of the spokesperson of the Secretary General 
and prepares instruments that serve as guidelines, for instance the master narratives 
and the monthly outlook, which contain information and wording concerning topics 
which are of interest to the press. The Media Operations Centre also organises trips to 
Afghanistan for journalists and academics.12 
 
NATO’s main tool to reach the general public is its website.13 Both the general NATO 
website and the thematic pages about ISAF are of surprisingly poor quality in terms of 
navigation, graphics, and the amount and presentation of information. The website 
is currently being revamped and shall in the future include more interactive 
features.14 More progressively, NATO has launched NATO TV, a website that tries to 
be two things at once: on the one hand, high-ranking NATO officials argue that "we 
are very keen on not being perceived as propaganda. This is why we put raw 
                                                 
10 C. Schwennicke, "Verdruckste Krieger", Der Spiegel, 30 June 2008, p. 36. 
11 B. Obama, "Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan", West Point, 1 December 2009. 
12 NATO official A.  
13 Interview with NATO official C, Brussels, 23 April 2009. 
14 "NATO revamps its web site", NATO website, 27 March 2009. 
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footage on NATO TV".15 On the other hand, NATO TV also includes edited, partly 
highly emotional material such as the documentary ‘Taking the Fight to the 
Taliban’.16 
 
In Afghanistan, ISAF headquarters in Kabul is the centre of NATO’s communication 
activities. The ISAF commander and his spokesperson serve as the main contact 
points for the press. Furthermore, the five regional commands as well as all troop 
contributing nations have their own spokespersons who interact mainly with their 
respective national journalists. These spokespersons receive guidelines both from the 
Media Operations Centre at NATO headquarters and from their national militaries. As 
servants of two masters, they have to decide how to combine those two guidelines – 
which might, in extreme cases, contradict each other – themselves. As they are 
ultimately employed by their national militaries, to which they will return after their 
service in Afghanistan, they tend to lend more weight to their national framing of 
issues than to the NATO position.17 This is also true for the high-level generals in 
Afghanistan who interact with journalists. One NATO official said that for the Media 
Operations Centre, it was hopeless to try to influence their behaviour vis-à-vis the 
press, and this perception reveals a lot about the power relationship between NATO 
and member states when it comes to getting the message across.18  
 
While the aforementioned political and military communication efforts target the 
domestic publics or international and Afghan media, another branch of military 
communication is responsible for direct communication with the Afghan population: 
information operations. Long-term efforts in this regard usually involve troop-
produced media content, for instance the biweekly, free newspaper ISAF-News. With 
160.000 copies, it has the highest circulation of all Afghan newspapers and is widely 
distributed.19 
 
But since media do not have the same extensive effect on opinion formation in 
Afghanistan as in Western societies, other forms of opinion-shaping have to be taken 
into account. ISAF closely monitors the Islamic discourse about terrorism. Before 7 July 
2003, there had never been a suicide attack on Afghan soil, so many Afghans 
regard suicide attacks – one of the favoured means of insurgents today – as ‘un-
Afghan’. Increasingly, Afghan mullahs also label them as ‘un-Islamic’. There are more 
and more fatwas (Islamic legal opinions) renouncing suicide attacks and drugs, and 
                                                 
15 M. Stopford, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General Strategic Communications Services, 
speech, Shadow NATO Summit, Brussels, 1 April 2009. 
16 "Taking the Fight to the Taliban", NATO TV. 
17 NATO official B.  
18 NATO official A.  
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this has begun to influence Friday sermons across Afghanistan. NATO and NATO 
member states monitor the sermons of influential mullahs and know when they adopt 
new  fatwas and whether they justify or even call for insurgency against foreign 
troops. This information can be forwarded to the Afghan Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
which then exerts influence on the mullahs.20 
 
Although foreign actors have to leave action in religious matters within the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan to local authorities, NATO does push for decisive action in 
those areas. For instance, the Afghan government is responsible for the curricula of 
the  madaris (Islamic religious schools) and for schoolbooks as well as for the 
formation of new mullahs. NATO tries to ensure that fatwas denouncing suicide 
attacks and drug trafficking are taken into account in these domains, too.21 
 
NATO troops often take part in local shuras (meetings among the tribal elders) in 
order to hear the concerns of local population and to influence the local opinion 
leaders, the elders, directly. In this regard, the ISAF mission is very unconventional and 
far removed from the understanding that many troop-contributing nations have of 
military operations.22 The problem is that NATO is not adequately equipped for this 
task as it lacks a sufficient number of Dari- and Pashtu-speaking personnel. This 
constitutes a major weakness of NATO’s communication efforts.23 
 
A more controversial part of information operations are psychological operations, 
which are often associated with deception tactics.24 The dissemination of false 
information raises moral as well as tactical questions. First, it damages ISAF’s 
credibility with the population and the media; second, it cannot always be 
guaranteed that the target groups – the Afghan population, the Taliban and the 
Western population – are clearly separated. Information aimed at radical Afghans 
may be picked up by international media outlets and distributed in NATO member 
states, so that the domestic public is deceived as well.25 While the US military is said 
to employ deception tactics, other nations are more reluctant to do so. The NATO 
information operations concept itself allows deception only under very limited 
circumstances.26 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
22 NATO official B.  
23 NATO official C. 
24 C. Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations. Lessons Learned from Recent Operational 
Experience, Washington D.C., National Defence University Press, 2005, p. 42. 
25 J. Ludowese, Strategic Communication: Who Should Lead the Long War of Ideas?, Carlisle, 
U.S. Army War College, 2006, p. 8. 
26 NATO, "Overview of Info Ops Documents", 30 April 2009, p. 15. 
  10 Severin Peters 
A new approach to integrating the different aspects of NATO’s communication 
efforts in Afghanistan has been undertaken within ISAF headquarters in Kabul. There, 
new troop elements have been created which include personnel from different fields 
in order to coordinate and integrate their activities. Personnel from media 
operations, information operations, psychological operations and civil-military 
relations as well as legal and political advisors work together on strategic 
communication. Similar action has been taken by the NATO military command in the 
Supreme Headquarter Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) near Mons, Belgium, which is in 
charge of ISAF. At SHAPE, new organisational elements have been created, the 
strategic communication cells which comprise officials from different areas, including 
media relations, information operations, psychological operations and strategic 
communication.27  
 
The fact that SHAPE and ISAF have explored new territory by abolishing the 
traditional division between different forms of communication has led to an intense 
discussion within NATO about strategic communication. The member states have 
realised that strategic communication has been neglected in the past, and that the 
changes proposed by SHAPE have such major implications for the operation as a 
whole that they have to be discussed and approved by the highest political and 
military bodies of NATO, the North Atlantic Council and the Military Committee.28 This 
process is still underway, it will be interesting to observe how NATO adapts its future 
definition of and approach to strategic communication. 
 
2.3. Messages 
 
While the institutional set-up of ISAF communication poses considerable challenges, 
the content of the communication is no less problematic. NATO has two broad 
target groups for its strategic communication for ISAF: domestic publics and the 
Afghan public. The messages delivered to the two groups differ significantly.  
 
2.3.1. Target Group 1: Domestic Publics 
 
NATO and member state governments had neglected their domestic 
communication strategies for a simple reason: the domestic publics did not make an 
issue of it. Since 2006, though, citizens in Europe and North America have begun 
questioning the Afghanistan operation, wondering why their compatriots are dying in 
a far-flung place whose population does not seem to be too keen on Western 
influence.29 Furthermore, the rising death toll continues to contradict NATO’s official 
                                                 
27 NATO official A. 
28 Ibid. 
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standpoint that it is not losing but winning against the Taliban.30 Public support is 
necessary for the operation in general, but particularly crucial for the current surge, 
which entails an increase in soldiers, civilian personnel and money sent to the region. 
If domestic constituencies do not want to allocate further resources to Afghanistan, 
national politicians will be hesitant to offer more. 
 
The strongest case for the Afghanistan operation is the fact that 11 September 2001 
as well as the terrorist attacks in London (2004) and Madrid (2005) were planned in 
Afghanistan.31 Terrorist training camps still exist in Afghanistan, and radical Islamists 
from Europe and other parts of the world travel there for inspiration and training. If 
the international force were to leave Afghanistan, it is possible that the country 
would, under the influence of the Taliban, develop once again into a safe haven for 
terrorists. This message can be directly linked to national interests. The former German 
Defence Minister Peter Struck has coined the notion that "the security of Germany is 
also defended in the Hindu Kush".32 
 
The main problem with this line of argument is the Western publics’ fear of terrorist 
attacks has significantly diminished. Due to the few actual attacks after 11 
September 2001, many citizens feel no longer threatened. Indeed, many more 
European citizens died while fighting in Afghanistan than in terrorist attacks in Europe 
itself.33 Paradoxically, fear of terrorist attacks is necessary to sustain public support for 
the Afghanistan operation, while the goal of the operation is to keep Western citizens 
free of fear. In the absence of terrorist attacks, it is increasingly difficult to 
convincingly argue that ISAF is necessary for security in Europe and North America. 
Yet the argument remains the basis for defending the operation as it directly links the 
target group’s interest to Afghanistan. 
 
Once it is established that Afghan security is essential to Western security, the second 
message that NATO wants to send out is that Afghan security depends on the 
presence of Western forces. In fact, few observers question that the Afghan security 
forces are too weak to independently fend off Taliban attacks. Eight years after 
being pushed from power, the Taliban movement still represents a considerable 
threat to the Afghan state and its institutions.  
 
                                                 
30 NATO official B. 
31 J. Biden, Vice-President of the United States, speech, NATO headquarters, Brussels, 10 
March 2009. 
32 Cited in P. Strutynski, "'Die Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt'", 
Kassel, Universität Kassel, 2007. 
33 N. MacFarlane, "New Security Challenges and Conflict Prevention", lecture, College of 
Europe, Bruges, 24 February 2009. 
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NATO strongly emphasises that ISAF is only an assistance mission to the Afghan 
government, and that the latter is responsible for the security situation.34 With this 
message, NATO wants to put pressure on the Afghan government to step up efforts 
to take over more security tasks. The message is also a preparation of NATO’s exit 
strategy, as it implies that NATO will leave as soon as the Afghan government is 
entirely capable of securing the country on its own. The risk of this message is 
twofold. First, it may be valid with respect to ISAF’s official mandate, but it certainly 
does not mirror the reality on the ground where the foreign forces are the main 
guarantor of the stability of the current state system. Second, the argument is very 
defensive as it does not openly justify and motivate the operation, but rather tries to 
frame ISAF’s action in an evasive manner. NATO’s main communication objective 
should be to convince domestic publics of the need for further NATO presence in 
Afghanistan, and the notion that the Afghan forces, not NATO, are responsible for 
Afghan security softens this very argument.  
 
But the problem with NATO’s messages is not so much the selection of the messages, 
but rather the emphasis that different actors put on different messages and the 
general effort that leaders have made to push the messages into the public sphere. 
Both national leaders and senior NATO officials have neglected the important task of 
strongly targeting their home constituencies for too long. Not only have they chosen 
the wrong messages; they have not devoted enough time and energy into 
presenting them to the public. Leading politicians have merely reacted to popular 
criticism once it arose instead of preventing it by early, decisive communicative 
action.  
 
2.3.2. Target Group 2: The Afghan Population 
 
The majority of Afghans supports a continued presence of foreign troops in 
Afghanistan. Approval rates for ISAF have fluctuated in the last years between 63 
and 80 percent, while the increased use of air strikes has damaged the reputation of 
international forces.35 In Afghanistan, the ‘battle for the hearts and minds’ is one with 
clear fronts: the enemy is the Taliban movement. Roughly speaking, decreasing 
popular support for the Taliban equals higher approval for the Afghan government 
and foreign troops, and vice versa. 
 
The Taliban have "created a sophisticated communications apparatus that projects 
an increasingly confident movement".36 Even NATO communication officials express 
                                                 
34 "NATO's role in Afghanistan", op.cit. 
35 NATO official A. 
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36 International Crisis Group, "Taliban Propaganda: Winning the War of Words", Brussels/Kabul, 
24 July 2008, p. i. EU Diplomacy Paper 1/2010 
their deep professional respect for the Taliban’s communication campaign. The 
Taliban use a wide range of instruments, most importantly several spokespersons who 
are available to local and foreign media around the clock via satellite phone. 
Furthermore, the Taliban operate a website which is updated several times a day in 
five languages; they produce magazines and leaflets; and they distribute sermons 
and battle reports via DVDs and audio cassettes. Recently, they have even used cell 
phones for their communication, for instance by offering free ringtones for 
download.37 
 
One of the biggest challenges for NATO is the fact that the Taliban very rapidly 
exploit ISAF’s military operations. Air campaigns, together with arbitrary detentions, 
have been the major factors that have undermined public support for NATO in 
Afghanistan. When an air strike occurs, the Taliban announce just hours – or even 
minutes – after the attack that a certain number of innocent civilians have been 
killed, and this (usually exaggerated) number has often been picked up by local and 
even international media. Only recently, international media started refraining from 
printing Taliban information as they have learned that Taliban figures are usually 
more fiction than fact. 
 
While NATO is working on reducing its reaction time to Taliban disinformation, it uses 
several arguments to undermine Taliban credibility. Firstl it tries to depict the Taliban 
as illegitimate and un-Islamic through cooperation with Afghan Islamic institutions, for 
instance by indirectly influencing Friday sermons. NATO has started to emphasise the 
close connection between the Taliban and drug trafficking, thus assigning them 
criminal and economic rather than religious and ideological motives. Furthermore, 
NATO disseminates reports about illegal actions taken by Taliban members. For 
instance, NATO has spread a picture showing a Taliban fleeing from coalition forces 
in a burka (a traditional female garment), which is unacceptable from a cultural and 
Islamic point of view. US forces also used deception, for instance by spreading 
rumours about Taliban being involved in satanist practices.38 
 
Besides delegitimizing the Taliban, the two main messages NATO sends to the Afghan 
public are that NATO is helping the country and that NATO is not an occupier but will 
leave as soon as Afghans are ready to provide for their own security. But the Afghan 
population cannot be won over by communication alone. Political measures to gain 
Afghan backing include the current surge: when NATO has more soldiers, it uses air 
strikes less frequently, which is likely to have positive effects on NATO’s reputation. 
Even the most general policy decisions made by NATO – such as stepping up 
                                                 
37 Ibid., p. 16. 
38 NATO official A. 
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reconstruction and development aid – are, in a way, a means of showing the 
Afghan population that they profit from the presence of the international 
community. 
 
Still, NATO is underperforming in terms of winning over the Afghan public.39 
Interaction with civil society does take place, but is still too limited. Especially with 
regard to the high illiteracy rate and the low reach of Afghan media, the number of 
Dari and Pashtu speaking officials who reach out to the Afghan population is far too 
low. NATO lacks language skills and has not managed to create lasting bonds with 
Afghan civil society. A faster reaction to Taliban disinformation will not be enough to 
convince Afghans that supporting ISAF is in their interest.40  
 
NATO communication to domestic target groups has significantly improved in recent 
years, but still struggles to convince that ISAF is a worthwhile operation. Member 
states bear the primary responsibility for explaining to their home constituencies why 
soldiers are dying in Afghanistan, and the best argument for this is that ISAF is self-
defence against future terrorism. NATO’s role towards the domestic publics is largely 
to coordinate and complement member states’ efforts. In Afghanistan, NATO has a 
much higher responsibility as member states are less active in addressing the Afghan 
population. NATO has started to improve its communication efforts towards the 
Afghan public, but current activities are insufficient to win Afghan hearts and minds. 
 
3. EULEX Kosovo 
 
3.1. Background 
 
When the first EU officials went to Kosovo in April 2006 to prepare an ESDP operation 
aimed at supporting the local authorities as they prepared for independence, 
Kosovo, although officially a part of Serbia, was under the authority of the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).41 After several attempts by 
the EU and the USA to push for an agreement with Serbia and Russia about Kosovo’s 
independence had failed, the EU decided on 16 February 2008 to launch a rule of 
law mission in order to strengthen Kosovar authorities which were supposed to take 
over responsibility for governing the territory from UNMIK. One day later, Kosovo 
unilaterally declared independence, a questionable move from a legal perspective. 
Many nations did not recognise Kosovo’s independence, among them five EU 
member states who feared that the unilateral declaration of independence would 
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strengthen separatist movements in their own countries. Still, all EU member states 
continued to support the deployment of EULEX.42 
 
Fearing EULEX was a means to implement Kosovo’s independence, Russia denied it a 
mandate in the UN Security Council, thus putting the entire operation into question. 
As Serbia, a potential candidate for EU accession, did not want to affront the EU too 
severely, it agreed to a legal construction whereby EULEX was deployed under the 
umbrella of the UN mission, under the condition that EULEX would remain strictly 
neutral to the status of Kosovo, that is, the question of its independence.43  
 
As the largest and most important civilian mission ever launched by the EU, EULEX 
was seen as an opportunity to step up communication efforts for ESDP operations. 
ESDP operations are an opportunity for the EU to show to a wider public that it is a 
powerful and responsible international actor. Communication for ESDP operations 
could be at the heart of efforts to shape the perception of the EU’s foreign policy. 
Yet the EU has failed to do so during past ESPD missions for several reasons. First of all, 
many ESDP operations were deployed either for symbolic or for learning reasons. 
Before boasting of its capacities, the EU wanted to make sure it had mastered the 
respective missions. This corresponded with the EU’s technical approach to 
international politics and to communication. The EU did not try to ‘sell’ its operations, 
but rather distributed information and factsheets to journalists – even more so for 
operations with limited scope and objectives.44 
 
This status quo was deemed insufficient by EU communication officials as it did not 
enable the EU to use the full communicative potential of ESDP operations in order to 
display the EU as a strong international actor. In this respect, EULEX Kosovo was 
supposed to usher in a new era. However, I will show that political difficulties outside 
of the mission’s responsibility have prevented EULEX from living up to these 
expectations.45 
 
3.2. Actors 
 
There are two main actors involved in the process of communicating EULEX to the 
public: the office of the spokesperson of the High Representative and the Press and 
Public Information Office (PPIO), which is part of the mission and situated in the 
mission headquarters in Pristina, Kosovo. Member states are not very involved in 
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communicating the operation, while coordination with other actors both inside and 
outside the EU plays a vital role. 
 
The spokesperson of the High Representative is the informal head of the 
communication activities for EULEX Kosov o  a n d  g u i d e s  t h e  w o r k  o f  t h e  P P I O .  
Although the PPIO in Pristina is formally accountable to the head of mission and to 
the Political and Security Committee, a Council body which is composed of member 
states’ ambassadors, the office of the spokesperson has taken informal responsibility 
for being the main channel of all ESDP operations to the outside world. The 
spokesperson herself insists that her office is the front desk for all communication 
activities, and that the PPIO is directly accountable to her.46 
 
The tasks of the office of the spokesperson are twofold. The spokesperson herself is 
the only authorised speaker in Brussels for EULEX, which means that only she and the 
High Representative can be quoted by the press. Meanwhile, the bulk of the press 
work in Brussels is managed by a communications advisor who acts as the focal 
point for the media, giving regular background briefings.47 The communication 
advisor also guides the work of the PPIO through regular interaction. It is the first time 
that such a position has been created within an ESDP operation.48  
 
The tasks of the offices in Brussels and Pristina are delineated as follows: while Brussels 
is responsible for the strategic planning and the press work for stories which either 
originate in Brussels or are of strategic importance, all operational and micro-
management duties are referred to the PPIO in Pristina. Questions referring to the 
Kosovar public – ‘local information for local consumption’ – are only communicated 
in Pristina, and Brussels does not interfere with the way the PPIO presents those local 
stories to the press.49 
 
The PPIO is much larger than the Brussels office. While in the office of the 
spokesperson, only two people – the communications advisor and the spokesperson 
herself for whom EULEX is only a small part of her duties – deal with EULEX Kosovo, the 
PPIO employs 16 personnel, including administrative workers and interpreters. The 
PPIO develops its own press lines, manages the website, organises local events and 
meetings with civil society and has even produced TV advertisements, a novelty for 
ESDP operations.50  
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The quality of these instruments differs. The website, albeit rather dry and factual, 
adheres to the standard of political webpages, including appropriate design, 
structure and information – something that cannot be said of all websites of ESDP 
operations. The site includes a participatory element – the possibility to directly 
contact the head of mission – which can be seen as a first step to use the internet 
not only as a means of one-way communication, but as a platform for interaction. 
On the negative side, until mid-April 2009, the Albanian and Serbian language 
versions were still under construction, with pictures missing and texts containing 
numerous spelling mistakes, especially in Serbian language. Furthermore, the website 
includes audiovisual material, but only in unedited, raw versions. Although this 
material could be helpful for TV journalists, ordinary visitors of the site are confronted 
with half-baked video clips which irritate rather than illuminate.51 
 
The three TV advertisements which briefly present the mission to the Kosovo public do 
not meet professional advertising standards. They lack a basic creative concept and 
professional production; indeed, they give the impression of being self-produced by 
EULEX. In addition, their dry tonality underlines the unappealing, unemotional and 
technical parts of the EU’s image. It is doubtful whether the spots’ poor quality can 
stimulate efforts to gain support in Kosovo for the EULEX operation.52 
 
More successful is EULEX’s outreach to Kosovar civil society. The PPIO organises 
regular meetings with local communities throughout Kosovo. EU officials underline 
the importance of civil society dialogue and their determination to reach out to 
NGOs and local structures, so that "civil society groups can be communicators of a 
common message, providing information and taking a lead when it comes to 
checks and balances in the rule of law area".53 This activity is not limited to the 
Kosovar Albanian population; EULEX also reaches out to the Serbian community in 
Kosovo.54 
 
EU member states are not very involved in the communication efforts for EULEX 
Kosovo. Contrary to the situation within NATO, there are no national caveats in the 
EU.55 EU member states cannot define special roles for their seconded staff within 
ESDP operations, so their roles within the missions differ mainly with respect to the 
number of staff they are deploying. National personnel deployed in ESDP operations 
are under the direct command of the head of mission. As the member states’ 
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governments are not directly involved in managing the operation, their 
communicative approaches are similar. Even those member states which do not 
recognise Kosovo as an independent country have approved EULEX and contribute 
or are planning to contribute national staff to the mission.56 
 
In practice, member states do of course mention the EULEX operation in 
communicative activities related to Kosovo in general, but they do not undertake 
additional initiatives such as national press trips or special websites. Instead, the 
websites of the foreign ministries of two large EU member states, Germany and 
France, prominently feature EU documents and a link to the EULEX website, thus 
referring visitors with a deeper interest in EULEX to the EU.57 EU officials point out that 
rather than obstructing a common approach, the perspectives of different member 
states can be used by EULEX to promote certain stories for the press, for instance by 
offering the story of a French judge to a French journalist. In this sense, the different 
member states are rather seen as a communicative chance rather than as a 
challenge.58 
 
EULEX has to coordinate with the member states as well as with other EU actors in the 
region. Besides EULEX, the EU is present in Kosovo through an EU Special 
Representative and a European Commission Liaison Office. Notably, the three actors 
jointly conducted a roadshow called ‘Come to Europe’ in spring 2008 which 
announced the deployment of EULEX and presented the action of the EU in Kosovo. 
The roadshow was an attempt to directly involve and get into contact with the 
Kosovar population, and was presented in both Albanian and Serbian. The ‘Come to 
Europe’ roadshow was significant insofar as it represented a turning point in EU 
communication for ESDP operations: it did not rely on one-way communication, but 
involved dialogue and participatory elements. A survey by a Kosovar research 
institute has shown that the roadshow was effective in relaying EU messages to the 
general populace.59 
 
3.3.  Messages 
 
EU communication for EULEX has three relatively distinct target groups: the EU 
publics, Kosovar Albanians and the Serbian community in Kosovo and Serbia. The 
strategies towards the three groups vary considerably, as their attitudes towards the 
deployment of EULEX are fundamentally different.  
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3.3.1. Target Group 1: EU Publics 
 
It has been argued above that ESDP operations in general and EULEX Kosovo in 
particular offer a great opportunity to portray the EU as a strong and responsible 
international actor. When the EU started planning a civilian mission in Kosovo in spring 
2006, this was exactly the approach it wanted to take: the plan was to push the 
communicative dimension of the operation strongly in order to strengthen the image 
of the EU’s foreign policy.60 
 
But due to political developments, this strategy was impossible to pursue: in order to 
portray EULEX as a symbol for a coherent, effective EU foreign policy, EULEX had to 
be a legitimate, credible, internationally agreed mission. In 2006, the EU had hoped 
that EULEX could be such a mission due to (1) a mandate of the UN Security Council, 
(2) an agreement about Kosovo’s status and (3) a common position of all member 
states towards Kosovo. All three hopes were in vain, and this delayed the deploy-
ment of EULEX as well as damaging its reputation even before the mission began.  
 
The lack of a UN Security Council mandate necessitated a creative legal 
construction in order to place EULEX under the umbrella of the UN mission to Kosovo. 
That has undermined the legitimacy of EULEX.61 The different attitudes of EU member 
states towards Kosovo’s status as well as pressure from Russia and Serbia have led to 
the status neutrality of EULEX. Although all member states – involving the ones that do 
not recognise Kosovo – did agree to launch EULEX, thereby proving that the 
deployment of EULEX was detached from the status question, the lack of unity within 
the EU did cast a damning light on the civilian mission. It became apparent that the 
EU did not possess the diplomatic weight to push through a solution for a problem 
that touched its vital interests. Furthermore, the eternal dilemma of EU foreign policy 
decision-making became obvious: the requirement of unanimity in the Council 
especially in controversial issues drastically limits the EU’s ability to speak and act as 
one international actor. If one also takes into account EULEX’s lack of legitimacy, it is 
hardly conceivable to portray EULEX as a success story of EU foreign policy towards 
the EU public.  
 
The fact that several member states have not recognised Kosovo is not only of 
symbolic value. Since the EU member states have diverging political positions, the EU 
as such has to largely ignore the political dimension of its involvement in Kosovo in its 
communication efforts. As the EU’s foreign policy is based on unanimity, the EU has 
to act and communicate on the basis of the lowest common denominator. This 
leaves no other choice for EU communication efforts than to present EULEX as an 
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apolitical, technical mission, and this is why one major message that EULEX sends out 
is that the operation could be deployed without Kosovar independence. In a sense, 
the message is a non-message: its main characteristic is that EULEX officials remain 
completely silent about the question of Kosovo’s status. EULEX has to be presented 
as being totally detached from the status question, and as the status question is the 
overarching theme of media reports and public discussion about Kosovo, EULEX 
communication has to refrain from participating in or even shaping this discourse, 
which means that EULEX has to downplay its own political denotation. The focus of 
communication is not on what EULEX stands for, but on what EULEX is. This follows the 
tradition of what Fiske de Gouveia and Plumridge have dubbed European Infopolitik, 
meaning that EU public diplomacy focuses on "accurate and impartial information" 
rather than on a more influence-oriented strategy of "selling" foreign policy.62 
 
The technical approach towards the EU public does not only refer to the messages 
which are sent out, but also to the degree of proactivity. EU officials acknowledge 
that due to political difficulties, they cannot communicate EULEX as proactively as 
they had hoped from the outset in 2006.63 Rather, public relations efforts remain low-
key. The EU does not try to push EULEX in the media, but rather explains the operation 
to those journalists who actively ask for statements or clarifications, which is a 
defensive, passive communication strategy. 
 
However, EULEX is presented as a sign of the EU’s growing foreign policy capabilities 
in one respect: the EU continuously promotes it as the largest civilian mission it has 
ever deployed. 
 
3.3.2. Target Group 2: The Kosovar Albanian Public 
 
For the Kosovar Albanian press and public, the questions of Kosovo’s status and 
independence rank at the top of the agenda. The Kosovar press is highly sensitive to 
supposed threats to independence, and the division of the EU on the issue has 
created a certain amount of mistrust among the Kosovar Albanian public.64  
 
The biggest communicative challenge for EULEX are the high expectations that the 
Kosovar Albanian public holds of the EU and EULEX. Due to the strong support of 
most Western countries for Kosovo’s independence and a decade-long experience 
with a UN mission which had executive powers and actually ran the Kosovar 
administration, the Kosovar public has become accustomed to thinking that the 
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international community is responsible for solving Kosovo’s problems. Consequently, 
much of the press reporting in Kosovo accuses EULEX of not doing enough, especially 
regarding Kosovar Serbian territories. Many Kosovar Albanians expect EULEX to 
integrate the Serbian parts of Kosovo into the Albanian Kosovar structures from the 
beginning. This demand is seen by EULEX officials as naive; they point out that there 
has been a real separation between the Albanian and Serbian parts of Kosovo for 
ten years, and that this division will not be overcome by forces from the outside.65  
 
EULEX had repeatedly had to explain to the Kosovar Albanian press and public that 
its mandate is much narrower than that of the UN mission, and that EULEX is not 
running the administration but merely assisting the Kosovo government and 
administration through advice, training and mentoring. Consequently, the main 
slogan on EULEX’s website is "supporting local ownership" in order to underline that 
the Kosovo government bears the main responsibility for the country.66  
 
Thus, EULEX constantly has to explain that it is less powerful and important than many 
Kosovar Albanians think and suggest, that its mandate is limited, that its functions are 
modest. This line of argument is defensive. Instead of advertising its strengths, EULEX 
underlines the limits of its own capacity. The negative spin that EULEX gives its own 
work is understandable from a political point of view, but it still does not further the 
image of EULEX as an effective and positive actor. 
 
Still, the EU’s communication towards Kosovar Albanians is not limited to the 
defensive message of delegating responsibility to the Kosovo government. The main 
positive argument that EULEX puts forth is the promise of a Kosovar future within the 
EU. This line of argument is a well-established strategy in order to stimulate pro-EU 
reform in countries which are or might be candidates for EU accession. It has been 
extensively argued that with the help of the ‘golden carrot’ of EU membership, the 
EU triggered some of the most dramatic political and socioeconomic changes in 
recent history, most notably in Central and Eastern European countries. Many 
observers point out, though, that due to enlargement fatigue in the EU public, it is 
risky to promise future membership to any country, as the disappointment of a 
possible rejection of their application might result in anti-EU sentiments within the 
political leadership and the population.67 
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EULEX communication officials do not share these reservations. By choosing ‘Come 
to Europe’ as the name of the roadshow which introduced and explained the EU 
and EULEX to a wider population in Kosovo, the EU opened a membership 
perspective for Kosovo. Meanwhile, the central policy of EULEX is the promotion of 
the rule of law in Kosovo. The confidence of the Kosovar population into the 
legitimacy and credibility of Kosovar rule of law institutions – the police, the customs, 
the judicial system – has to be built from scratch. In a country where, if your car is 
stolen, you are likely to go to the local mafia boss in order to claim it back, it is not an 
easy task to convince people of the strength, rightfulness and trustworthiness of state 
institutions.68  
 
This is a communicative and political challenge at the same time, as only real 
changes on the ground will affect the Kosovars’ attitude – but communication efforts 
and especially the dialogue with civil society play a vital role in restoring trust in the 
rule of law. Furthermore, the practical work by which EULEX strengthens the rule of 
law in Kosovo is at the centre of EULEX’s everyday media relations which portray the 
small success stories of the operation. This gives Kosovar Albanians, but also Kosovar 
Serbs an idea of the changes EULEX brings to Kosovo. 
 
3.3.3. Target Group 3: Serbs and Kosovar Serbs 
 
The stance of Kosovar Serbs is crucial to the success of EULEX. Kosovar Serbs – 
especially those living in the northern part of Kosovo which borders Serbia – generally 
regard themselves as Serbs and refuse to be governed by Kosovar Albanians. Under 
the UN administration, northern Kosovo was practically a part of Serbia, as it 
participated in Serbian national elections, was influenced by Serbian media and had 
its own administration which had very few links with the Kosovar Albanian structures.69 
 
While it remained unclear until the last minute whether EULEX would be capable of 
operating in the Serbian parts of Kosovo as well, the fact that it succeeded in doing 
so has triggered very positive reactions from the Kosovar Albanian press.70 Still, it is not 
yet established to what extent Kosovar Serbian officials and people will cooperate 
with EULEX. If it turns out that EULEX will be helpful in integrating Kosovar Serbian 
structures into the general Kosovo administration, this will be an important sign for the 
territorial integrity of Kosovo. If, on the other hand, northern Kosovo remains largely 
separated from the rest of Kosovo, it is highly unlikely that Serbia will ever recognise 
the state of Kosovo within its current borders. 
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It is the objective of EULEX to convince Kosovar Serbs that the deployment of EULEX is 
in their interest. Since most Kosovar Serbs are influenced by Belgrade media, EULEX 
has to reach out to the Serbian public as well. While some Kosovar Serbian leaders 
promote closer cooperation with EULEX and the Kosovar Albanian government, they 
meet harsh opposition from nationalist Serbs in Kosovo and Serbia. In fact, EULEX’s 
biggest communicative opponents are nationalist Serbian politicians who publicly 
claim that EULEX is implementing Kosovo’s independence. As the EULEX operation is 
neutral to the status of Kosovo, this claim is factually incorrect, and EULEX 
communication officials work hard to explain EULEX’s mandate and role to Serbian 
journalists in order to stop the dissemination of false information.71 
 
Beyond defending itself against Serbian nationalists, EULEX also has to convince 
Kosovar Serbs that the operation is actually in their interest. EULEX tackles this 
question by repeatedly stating its promotion of multi-ethnicity in the administration of 
Kosovo. This is supposed to show the Kosovar Serbs that they are not left out in the 
future of Kosovo, and that possible Kosovar Albanian attempts to sideline Kosovar 
Serbian interests will be confronted by EULEX. 
 
Finally, the EU also uses the promise of future EU membership towards Kosovar Serbs. 
The aforementioned roadshow ‘Come to Europe’ was staged under the same name 
(in Serbian translation) in Serbian enclaves within Kosovo, and it was meant to 
convince Kosovar Serbs that they would be better off as part of the EU – without 
going into detail about whether this would entail an autonomous nation of Kosovo.  
 
4. Conclusion: The Communicative Roles of International Organisations 
 
Strategic communication for crisis management operations is an issue gaining in 
importance. The analysis of two case studies of large, important operations which 
represent the state-of-the-art communication efforts of the EU and NATO has 
identified similarities and differences between the communication activities of the 
two organisations. 
 
NATO has paid the high price of domestic discontent for its long negligence of 
strategic communication for ISAF. Recently, communication for ISAF has seen a 
significant increase in attention, energy and resources, but remains difficult. NATO’s 
effort of trying to reconcile the different positions, namely between member states 
that emphasise reconstruction efforts and those that stress the military aspect, has 
shown some results – not least because national leaders have pushed for an 
equilibrium of civilian and military action on a political level, too. Especially on the 
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domestic front, the Media Operations Centre, NATO TV and the soon-to-be 
revamped website are clear signs that NATO takes responsibility for selling ISAF to 
domestic publics. Finally, NATO’s domestic role is restricted as member states take 
the lead role in explaining to their publics why their compatriots are fighting in 
Afghanistan. 
 
Communication with the Afghan public so far lacks a similar improvement. NATO has 
hardly been able to counter Taliban disinformation, and it has not invested enough 
in people with adequate language skills who can reach out to the local civil society. 
Recent initiatives in which actors of different communication disciplines – media 
relations, public affairs, information operations, psychological operations, and others 
– work together in newly created strategic communication cells point in the right 
direction and have triggered high-level discussion on strategic communication. 
NATO efforts in this respect are still evolving, and although these activities come too 
late, it seems that NATO has learned its lesson. 
 
EULEX communication goals are comparatively modest. Early plans to present EULEX 
as a symbol for the evolving strong international actorness of the EU have been 
undermined by political disagreements inside and outside of the Union about the 
status of Kosovo and the mission itself. These developments have led EULEX to pursue 
a reactive, defensive strategy towards the domestic public in which the technical 
tasks of the operation are highlighted rather than its political importance. 
 
While only one EU official in Brussels is in charge of communicating EULEX to the EU 
publics, the Press and Public Information Office in Pristina comprises 16 personnel. 
Consequently, communication towards the publics in Kosovo – both the Kosovar 
Albanians and the Kosovar Serbs – is more developed. Besides commendable efforts 
to overcome one-way communication and to enter into dialogue through a 
roadshow, an interactive feature on the website, regular meetings with civil society, 
and the poor quality of some instruments (most notably the TV advertisements) are 
inadequate for professional political communication. The promise of future EU 
membership – a controversial strategy as it raises expectations – helps to rally local 
support of EU action in Kosovo. 
 
Although the empirical basis of this study is too small to allow for definite general 
observations, the case studies suggest that the following elements are determining 
factors for strategic communication for crisis management operations of 
international organisations:  
-  the role of the member states, 
-  the need for domestic ratification, 
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-  the possibility of promoting the international organisation through the 
operation, 
-  the communicative capabilities of the international organisation, and 
-  the importance of the foreign public to the success of the operation. 
 
Figure 1: Different communicative roles of international organisations 
 
 
Source: author's classification. 
 
Figure 1 shows the different communicative tasks that international organisations 
may assume based on the role of the member states and the need for public 
support. The general rule regarding member state involvement in crisis management 
operations of international organisations seems to be the following: if an operation 
requires domestic ratification – which is usually the case for robust military 
interventions – member states increase their communication activities. This, in a 
second step, leads to a situation where general unity of message is hard to achieve 
due to the multitude of actors involved in the communication process, especially if 
the actors have different national priorities or caveats as in the case of NATO. The 
positive effect of the need for domestic ratification is that member states 
concentrate their attention on the communicative aspects of an operation, leading 
to a greater provision of resources.  
 
These actions limit the role of the international organisation to fulfilling coordinating or 
complementary tasks. For the short-term operational media work, the international 
organisation needs a sufficiently large press department. The bigger the 
communicative capabilities of the international organisation, the more it can 
influence national journalists according to a common strategy, for instance by press 
trips, background meetings, etc. If member states do not react sufficiently to 
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communicative needs towards the domestic publics, the international organisation 
can motivate them to do more. 
 
If, on the other hand, domestic ratification is not needed because the operation is 
uncontroversial, member states will be much less likely to communicate proactively. 
This facilitates the realisation of a unity of message, even if this message might be 
focussed on the lowest common denominator, and leaves the international 
organisation the choice to either neglect communication towards the domestic 
public – which creates risks for later, more controversial operations because no trust 
in the international organisation has been created in the public – or to push 
communication in order to present the crisis management operation as a symbol for 
the positive, strong role the organisation plays on the international scene. This is only 
possible, though, if the international organisation realises the communicative 
potential of crisis management operations and has sufficient communicative 
capabilities to pursue such a strategy. The risk is that without member state attention, 
international organisations may lack the resources necessary to conduct powerful 
campaigns. 
 
The communicative capabilities of an international organisation depend in large 
part on whether the member states have understood the importance of 
communication or not. In the case of NATO, strong investments in communication 
resulted from pressure on the member states. As EU member states have not yet felt 
such pressure from ESDP operations, they have not yet rectified the problem of the 
EU’s insufficient communication capabilities. 
 
The problems of this finding are twofold. First, it is not always clear from the outset of 
an operation whether it will require informal domestic ratification or not. ISAF was 
largely uncontroversial at first, so member states did not allocate a lot of attention to 
communication. Only at a later stage did ISAF cause substantial domestic public 
pressure which might have been softened by earlier proactive communication. 
Meanwhile, it is possible that EULEX will turn into a controversial mission, for instance if 
Serbia and Russia take a more confrontational position. In this case, the EU and its 
member states would suddenly have to explain EULEX to the EU public, and wish that 
they had done so earlier.  
 
Second, the argument that strong domestic pressure leads to higher resources for 
communication activities is detached from the importance of the foreign public. It 
has been argued that resources for communication activities partly depend on 
member states’ awareness of the importance of communication, and that this is in 
turn dependent on the need for domestic ratification. But what if there is no need for 
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domestic ratification – and consequently a small communication budget – but a 
strong need to target the foreign public?  
 
Member states are quite sensitive to communicative pressure from their own 
domestic publics, but both case studies have shown that they are less interested in 
the foreign public, although this is changing in the case of Afghanistan due to 
spillovers from rising attention to the domestic publics. This means that international 
organisations must take the primary responsibility for communicating with the foreign 
public, and they have to persuade their member states of the need to provide 
resources accordingly. While the role of international organisations in communicating 
to the domestic publics depends on the involvement of member states, international 
organisations have to understand that they are the main drivers of communication 
to the foreign public. In the case of EULEX, this has already materialised, although 
communication officials have so far proven unable of convincing policy-makers that 
an increase in communication staff would have a greater positive effect than 
sending the same number of border officials. 
 
Most importantly, all actors have to move from a culture of reacting to public 
pressure to a strategy of early, proactive communication to domestic and foreign 
publics. This study has shown that awareness of international organisations and their 
member states of the importance of strategic communication for crisis management 
operations is rising. The translation of this insight into practical changes is an ongoing 
process, and it will be interesting to observe how this emerging field will develop in 
the coming years.  
 
Further research is needed to monitor these developments and to confirm and 
expand the arguments of this study which relies on the relatively modest empirical 
basis of two case studies. In particular, the qualitative approach of this study should 
t o  b e  c o m p l e m e n t e d  b y  q u a n t i t a t i v e  r e s e a r c h  c o v e r i n g  a  w i d e  r a n g e  o f  c r i s i s  
management operations in order to verify the findings of this paper. 
 
Finally, a sorrowful anecdote gives rise to hope. In October 2008, at a funeral for 
soldiers who had died in Afghanistan, former German Defence Minister Franz Josef 
Jung used, for the first time, the word ‘Gefallene’ which translates as "casualties of 
war".72 In October 2009, his successor Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg went a step further 
by calling the operation a ‘war’73. This word choice shows that efforts to create a 
larger ‘unity of message’ can achieve success – even in challenging communicative 
situations.  
                                                 
72 C. Thiels, "Jung spricht erstmals von Gefallenen", tagesschau.de, 24 October 2009. 
73 "'Krieg' für Guttenberg kein Tabu mehr", tagesschau.de, 3 November 2009.  
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